Revisiting Equitable Tolling and the Federal Tort
Claims Act: The Impact of Brockamp and Beggerly
Richard Parker
Ugo Colella -The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) waives the United States's immunity from tort liability and prescribes two time limitations with which
plaintiffs must comply. A plaintiff has two years from the time her claim accrues to file a claim with the relevantfederal agency, and after the claim is finally denied, a plaintiff has six months to file suit in federal district court.
Priorto 1990, courts uniformly held that these time limitations were jurisdictional prerequisites to suit in federal court and could not be equitably tolled.
In 1990, the United States Supreme Court decided Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, a Title VII case in which the Court held that there is a rebuttable presumption that limitationsperiods in waiver-of-sovereign-immunity
statutes can be equitably tolled. Although Irwin did not address the FTCA,
lower courts have reflexively relied upon Irwin for the proposition that the
FTCA 's limitationsperiods are not jurisdictionaland can be equitably tolled.
However, the Supreme Court's recent decisions in United States v.
Brockamp and United States v. Beggerly limit the scope of Irwin, permitting equitable tolling only when it is consistent with Congress's intent.
Brockamp and Beggerly also reaffirm the pre-Irwin view that a limitations
period is a jurisdictionalprerequisiteto suit if that period is a condition upon
the United States's waiver of sovereign immunity. In this Article, we argue
that Brockamp and Beggerly provide a clearerframework for determining
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when the presumption of equitable tolling may be rebutted. That framework,
we suggest, compels the conclusion that the time limitations in the FTCA are
jurisdictionaland should not be equitably tolled. Accordingly, this Article
callsfor a wholesale reversal of case law that is to the contrary.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States, as a sovereign, cannot be sued unless Congress enacts legislation that subjects the United States to liability.'
That principle sounds simple enough, but divining Congress's intent
in waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes has proved difficult, with
courts struggling to ascertain how wide Congress has opened the
courthouse and Treasury doors to claims against the United States.
Whether limitations periods that extinguish rights against the United
States can be equitably tolled is one stage upon which this difficulty
has played itself out. Limitations periods are by their very nature
harsh because they cut off a person's rights without regard to the
merits of the claim. The doctrine of equitable tolling has evolved to
temper this harsh result, at least when the defendant is somehow at
fault for the plaintiffs failure to file a timely claim. The question of
whether limitations periods applicable to plaintiffs suing the United
I See, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1990); United States v.
Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 38889 (1939).
2 See, e.g., Irwin v. Department of
Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
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States should be equitably tolled has produced seemingly contradictory answers.
In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, the United States Supreme Court, interpreting Title VII, held that there is a rebuttable
presumption that limitations periods in waiver-of-immunity statutes
may be equitably tolled. The Irwin Court retreated from the practice
of determining whether a limitations period may be equitably tolled
by parsing the words of a statute of limitations for signs of stringency
or leniency. That search for a linguistic answer to the equitabletolling question, concluded the Court, caused confusion without
necessarily effectuating Congress's intent.6 Applying the rebuttablepresumption rule to the facts of Irwin, the Court reasoned that, although the United States's waiver of sovereign immunity is limited
and should be strictly construed, the doctrine of equitable
tolling is
7
consistent with the congressional intent behind Title VII.
Irwin cannot be confined to the Title VII context because the
rebuttable-presumption rule of statutory construction is applicable to
all waiver-of-immunity statutes.8 The Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA)
lies in Irwin's path. The FTCA waives the United States's immunity
for certain torts committed by federal employees acting within the
scope of their employment. The FTCA contains two limitations periods that stem from the Act's mandatory requirement that plaintiffs
present their claims to the appropriate federal agency for possible
settlement prior to filing suit in federal court.' The FTCA claimant
has two years from the time the claim accrues to file that claim, and
then six months to file suit if the claim is denied." Prior to Irwin,
courts almost uniformly held that these time limitations were jurisdictional prerequisites to suit in federal district court and could not be
equitably tolled.'2
After Irwin, however, the judicial landscape
3 498 U.S. 89 (1990).
4 See id. at 95-96.
5 See id.
at 95.
G See id.
7 See id. at 95-96.
8 See
id.
9 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2401(b),
2671-2680 (1994).
10See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a); McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 110-13 (1993)
(holding that the administrative-presentment requirement is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal district court).
1 See28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
12 See, e.g., Gould v. United States Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 905 F.2d 738,
742 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (interpreting the two-year limitations period); Berti v.
Veterans Admin. Hosp., 860 F.2d 338, 340 (9th Cir. 1988) (interpreting the sixmonth limitations period); Houston v. United States Postal Serv., 823 F.2d 896, 902
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changed radically and abruptly. Many courts reflexively held that Irwin compels the conclusion that the FTCA's limitations periods are
notjurisdictional and can be equitably tolled.1 3 That is where we are
today.
Enter the Supreme Court's recent decisions in United States v.
Brockamp'4 and United States v. Beggerly.1 5 Read together, these deci(5th Cir. 1987) (commenting on the two-year and six-month limitations periods),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1006 (1988); Anderberg v. United States, 718 F.2d 976, 977
(10th Cir. 1983) (interpreting the six-month limitations period), cert. denied, 466 U.S.
939 (1984); Peterson v. United States, 694 F.2d 943, 944-45 (3d Cir. 1982)
(interpreting the two-year limitations period); Leonhard v. United States, 633 F.2d
599, 624 (2d Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); Best Bearings Co. v.
United States, 463 F.2d 1177, 1179 (7th Cir. 1972) (dictum) (same), rev'd on other
grounds in Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1997); Childers v.
United States, 442 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971) (interpreting the six-month limitations period); Powers v. United States, 390 F.2d 602, 604 (9th Cir. 1968)
(interpreting the two-year limitations period); Frey v. Woodard, 481 F. Supp. 1152,
1154 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (interpreting the two-year limitations period); Lien v. Beehner,
453 F. Supp. 604, 605-06 (N.D.N.Y. 1978) (same); Pringle v. United States, 419 F.
Supp. 289, 292 (D.S.C. 1976) (same); Binn v. United States, 389 F. Supp. 988, 991
(E.D. Wis. 1975) (same); Hoch v. Carter, 242 F. Supp. 863, 865 (S.D.N.Y. 1965)
(same); Kilduffv. United States, 248 F. Supp. 310, 314 (E.D. Va. 1960) (same). But
see Zavala v. United States, 876 F.2d 780, 783 (9th Cir. 1989) (recognizing that
FTCA's two-year statute of limitations may be tolled under limited circumstances);
Executive Jet Aviation, Inc. v. United States, 507 F.2d 508, 516-17 & n.4 (6th Cir.
1974) (same); Ciccarone v. United States, 486 F.2d 253, 256 (3d Cir. 1973) (same);
Kossick v. United States, 330 F.2d 933, 936 (2d Cir.) (same), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 837
(1964).
13 See, e.g., Kronisch v. United States, 150 F.3d 112, 121-23 (2d Cir. 1998); Kanar,
118 F.3d at 530-31; Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 107 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir.
1996); Lambert v. United States, 44 F.3d 296, 298-99 (5th Cir. 1995); Glarner v.
United States Dep't of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994); Benge v.
United States, 17 F.3d 1286, 1288 (10th Cir. 1994); Muth v. United States, 1 F.3d
246, 251 (4th Cir. 1993); Oropallo v. United States, 994 F.2d 25, 29 n.4 (1st Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1050 (1994); de Casenave v. United States, 991 F.2d 11,
12-13 n.2 (1st Cir. 1993); Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991);
Hyatt v. United States, 968 F. Supp. 96, 100-01 (E.D.N.Y. 1997); Bartus v. United
States, 930 F. Supp. 679, 682 (D. Mass. 1996); Ezenwa v. Gallen, 906 F. Supp. 978,
984 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Long v. Card, 882 F. Supp. 1285, 1287-88 (E.D.N.Y. 1995); Diltz
v. United States, 771 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D. Del. 1991).
We say that courts have applied Irwin "reflexively" because, rather than analyze
the language and legislative history of the FTCA to determine whether Congress intended to allow equitable tolling, courts have done nothing more than cite Irwin and
conclude that the FTCA's limitations periods are not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled. Some courts, however, have not been so quick to conclude that the
F CA's limitations periods are notjurisdictional. See Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d
157, 159 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that limitations periods are jurisdictional); Coska
v. United States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997) (same); Deutsch v. United States,
67 F.3d 1080, 1091 (3d Cir. 1995) (same); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776,
779 (1st Cir. 1992) (same); Bradley v. United States, 951 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir.
1991) (same).
14 117 S. Ct. 849 (1997).
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sions limit the reach of Irwin in three significant ways. First, Brockamp
and Beggerly reaffirm the view that limitations periods that condition
the United States's waiver of immunity are jurisdictional prerequisites
to suit.' 6 Second, the decisions reject the notion that equitable tolling is always permissible in cases involving the United States as defendant.17 Third, Brockamp and Beggerly suggest that equitable tolling
is permissible only after a court examines the language and purposes
of the waiver statute and concludes that Congress intended the court
to equitably toll the limitations period.1 8 Brockamp and Beggerly therefore confirm the jurisdictional nature of limitations periods in waiver
of immunity statutes and provide courts a more clear picture of what
is required to rebut the Irwin presumption favoring equitable tolling.
Despite the important questions raised by applying the doctrine
of equitable tolling to the limitations periods in waiver-of-immunity
statutes such as the FTCA, the law reviews have remained eerily silent
on the issue. 9 Indeed, the practical consequences of equitably tolling the FTCA's limitations periods have been far-reaching and surprising. Approximately 30,000 to 60,000 tort claims per year are filed
against the United States. 20 Applying the doctrine of equitable tolling
to each claim would result in processing delays that are inconsistent
with the purpose behind the FTCA's administrative-settlement
21
scheme. Moreover, courts that have relied on Irwin for the proposi118 S. Ct. 1862 (1998).
See Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. at 1868 (affirming the district court dismissal of a claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction for failure to comply with the limitations period); Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. at 851-53 (same).
17 See Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. at 1868; Brockamp,
117 S. Ct. at 851-53.
18 See Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. at 1868; Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. at 851-53.
19But see Richard Parker, Is the Doctrine of Equitable Tolling Applicable to the Limitations Periods in the Federal Tort Claims Act?, 135 MIL. L. REv. 1, 18 (Winter 1992)
(arguing that Irvin should not be read as permitting equitable tolling of the FTrCA).
Other commentators have addressed the equitable-tolling issue, but have not provided an analysis of whether or not the FTCA's limitations periods should be equitably tolled as a matter of law. See generally David L. Abney, For Whom the Statute Tolls:
Medical Malpractice Under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 696
(1986) (discussing equitable tolling in the medical malpractice area); Rouse, Equitable Tolling of the Statute of Limitations, 1995 ARMY LAw. 72 (Jan. 1995) (briefly reviewing FTCA/equitable-tolling case law); Kent Sinclair & Charles A. Szypszak, Limitations of Actions Under the FTCA: A Synthesis and Proposal,28 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 1, 10-11,
32-44 (1991) (arguing that courts have declined to equitably toll the FT'CA's limitations periods; presenting circumstances under which the two-year period may not
begin to run due to equitable considerations); Statute of Limitations - Tax Refund
Claims - Equitable Tolling, 12(4) FED. LITIGATOR 104 (Apr. 1997) (stating, without
anapsis, that the FTCA is subject to equitable tolling).
See 1 LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLINGFEDERALTORT CLAIMS § 1.01, at 1-8 (1993 rev.
ed.).
HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS
21 See, e.g.,
15
16
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tion that the FTCA's limitations periods are not jurisdictional have
deemed those time periods affirmative defenses, thereby imposing
the burden of proof on the United States. 2 Irwin has thus been
pressed into service as a burden-shifting device on the issue of subject
matter jurisdiction. This is so because plaintiffs ordinarily bear the
burden of proving Article III jurisdiction is proper. Finally, Irwin
has also deprived the United States of the benefits of Rule 12(b) (1)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 12(b) (1) permits parties to move to dismiss a case early for lack of subject matterjurisdiction. 24 Accordingly, those courts that have cited Irwin for the proposition that the FTCA's limitations periods are not jurisdictional have
necessarily precluded the United States from moving under Rule
12(b) (1) to dismiss cases for failure to comply with the Act's limitations periods.2 5 All of this has flowed from Irwin's seemingly benign
holding that there is a rebuttable presumption that limitations periods in waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes can be equitably tolled.
In this Article, we address the question of whether the FTCA's
limitations periods are jurisdictional and whether they should be equitably tolled after Brockamp and Beggerly. We argue that the decisions
compel at least two conclusions. First, the FTCA's limitations periods
are conditions on the United States's waiver of sovereign immunity,
so that compliance with the two-year and six-month limitations periods is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal district court.
Second, the text, purposes, and legislative history of the FTCA's limitations periods reveal that Congress did not intend equitable tolling
to apply to either the two-year or six-month time periods. We conclude that Brockamp and Beggerly require a wholesale reversal of case

ACT TO AUTHORIZE INCREASED AGENCY CONSIDERATION OF TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THE
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PuRPOSES, H.R_ REP. No. 1532, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7

(1966) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1532]; SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, INCREASED
AGENCY CONSIDERATION OF TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT, S. REP. No. 1327,

89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1966) [hereinafter S. REP. No. 1327].
See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 933 F.2d 639, 640 (8th Cir. 1991).
23 See Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. of America, 511 U.S.
375, 377 (1994);
CHARLES A. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 22-23 (4th ed. 1983).
24 SeeFED. R. CIrv. P. 12(b)(1).
25

See, e.g., Glarner v. United States Dep't of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701

n.4 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding that, because the FTCA's limitations periods are no
longer jurisdictional after Irwin, a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction should be converted into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment); Diltz v.
United States, 771 F. Supp. 95, 97 (D. Del. 1991) (holding that because the FTCA's
two-year limitations period is purportedly not jurisdictional after Irwin, United
States's motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) should be converted into a
Rule 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, which in turn should be
converted into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment).
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law holding that the FTCA's limitations are notjurisdictional and can
be equitably tolled.
In Part II, we discuss the FTCA's statute of limitations and the
impact Irwin has had on decisions interpreting the FTCA's limitations
periods. In Part III, we take a close look at Brockamp and Beggerly and
lay out the facts, reasoning, and holdings of those decisions. In Part
IV, we place Irwin in the proper jurisprudential context and extract
from the Brockamp-Beggerly duo principles of statutory construction
that should govern analyses of limitations periods in waiver-ofsovereign-immunity statutes. Then, in Part V, we apply the BrockampBeggerly framework to the limitations periods in the FTCA. We conclude that lower courts should re-examine their FTCA case law in
light of Brockamp and Beggerly and hold that the FTCA's limitations
periods are jurisdictional and should not be equitably tolled as a matter of law.
THE FTCA's LIMITATIONS PERIODS, EQUITABLE TOLLING, AND
IRWIN

II.

The FTCA imposes two distinct time limitations on plaintiffs,
which correspond to different procedures found in the Act. First, the
FTCA contains a mandatory administrative-exhaustion scheme that
requires plaintiffs to submit their tort claims to the relevant federal
agencies before filing suit in federal district court. 6 Plaintiffs must
do so within two years from the dates upon which their claims ac27
crue. In United States v. Kubrick,28 the Supreme Court held that a
claim accrues for purposes of the FTCA when a plaintiff knows, or in
the exercise of reasonable diligence, should know of an injury and its
cause.29 Failure to comply with the two-year limitations period bars
the claim "forever." 0 Second, once a claim is submitted to the appropriate federal agency and is finally denied, the FTCA plaintiff has
six months from the date of the denial to file suit in federal district
court. 3' An FTCA claim is "finally denied" for purposes of administrative exhaustion when, six months after the claim is received by the
agency, the claimant either receives a formal denial in writing or
deems the claim denied by taking some action like filing suit in fed-

"6 See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994).
27 See id. § 2401(b).
28

444 U.S. 111 (1979).

29See

s1

id. at 121.

See 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b).
See id.
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eral district court. 2 Like the two-year limitations period, a claim is
forever barred if the FTCA plaintiff fails to comply with the sixmonth time period.33
The FTCA's limitations periods are congressionally imposed
conditions upon the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity, so that
failure to comply with either time period deprives a federal district
court ofjurisdiction over the FTCA suit.34 In addition, the vast majority of courts at one time held that the two-year and six-month limitations periods could not be equitably tolled.35 Indeed, courts recognized that the FTCA contained a limited waiver of sovereign
immunity that is strictly construed, so that courts were not at liberty
to extend the time limitations in the FTCA beyond what Congress
expressly provided. 6 In addition, courts viewed the purpose behind
the FTCA's limitations periods - prompt presentation of claims
against the United States - as inconsistent with the doctrine of equitable tolling.37
And so the cases stood until 1990 when the Supreme Court de38
Irwin presented the
cided Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs.
question of whether failure to comply with Title VII's limitations period - without any consideration of equitable tolling -jurisdictionally barred a plaintiffs suit. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that, because
the plaintiff failed to comply with Title VII's thirty-day limitations period, the suit was jurisdictionally barred. The Fifth Circuit affirmed.39
The Supreme Court, although affirming the ultimate decision to
dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, held that the
doctrine of equitable tolling could be, in theory and under limited

See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a).
See id. § 2401(b).
34 See, e.g., Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117-18; Crawford v. United States,
796 F.2d 924,
927-28 (7th Cir. 1986).
35 See cases cited supra
note 12.
36 See, e.g., Gould v. United States Dep't of Health & Human
Servs., 905 F.2d 738,
742 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Berti v. Veterans Admin. Hosp., 860 F.2d 338, 340
(9th Cir. 1988); Burns v. United States, 764 F.2d 722, 724 (9th Cir. 1985); Childers v.
United States, 442 F.2d 1299, 1303 (5th Cir. 1971); Lien v. Beehner, 453 F. Supp.
604, 606 (N.D.N.Y. 1978); Pringle v. United States, 419 F. Supp. 289, 292 (D.S.C.
1976).
37 See, e.g., Gould, 905 F.2d at 742 (holding that § 2401(b)
"represents a deliberate balance struck by Congress").
38 498 U.S. 89
(1990).
39 See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 874 F.2d 1092, 1097 (5th
Cir.
1989), affd 498 U.S. 89, 96 (1990).
32

33
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circumstances, applied to suits against the United States. 40
The
linchpin of the Court's holding was that, although Congress did not
explicitly provide for equitable tolling in Title VII, permitting tolling
would do no violence to the congressional intent behind the statute.
According to the Court:
Once Congress has made such a waiver [of sovereign immunity],
we think that making the rule of equitable tolling applicable to
suits against the Government, in the same way that it is applicable
to private suits, amounts to little, if any, broadening of the congressional waiver. Such a principle is likely to be a realistic assessment of legislative intent as well as a practically useful principle of interpretation. We therefore hold that the same rebuttable
presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private
defendants should also apply to suits against the United States.
41
Congress, of course, may provide otherwise if it wishes to do so.
Rather than confine its ruling to Title VII, the Court appeared
to announce an equitable-tolling rule that would govern waiver-ofimmunity statutes across the board. In the Court's words,
[A] continuing effort on our part to decide each case on an ad
hoc basis, as we appear to have done in the past, would have the
disadvantage of continuing unpredictability without the corresponding advantage of greater fidelity to the intent of Congress.
We think that this case affords us an opportunity to adopt a more
general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits
against the Government. 2
Buoyed by Irwin's seemingly broad scope, lower courts that had
once held otherwise, suddenly concluded that the limitations periods
in the FTCA were not jurisdictional and could be equitably tolled.43
The interesting aspect of this judicial about-face was not the change
itself, but that it occurred without any analysis of the terms and legislative history of the FTCA's limitations periods; courts did not search
for congressional intent to see if the presumption favoring equitable
tolling was rebutted. In fact, many lower courts simply cited Irwin for
the proposition that the FTCA's limitations periods are not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled. Two recent Supreme Court decisions suggest that this type of drive-by analysis of equitable tolling
and the jurisdictional nature of limitations periods is wholly inappropriate.

40
41
42

43

See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94-96.
Id. at 95-96.
Id. at 95.
See cases cited supra note 13.
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III. THE SUPREME COURT'S POST-IRWINTOLLING DECISIONS
United States v. Brockamp

A.

In Brockamp, the Supreme Court had to decide whether the limitations period applicable to tax refund suits against the United States
could be equitably tolled on the basis of mental disability."4 The taxpayers rested their tolling contention on Irwin's shoulders, arguing
that, had they sued private defendants, equitable tolling would have
applied. Irwin, argued the taxpayers, compelled the conclusion that
the United States is on an equal footing with private defendants with
respect to equitable tolling, so that equitable tolling was appropriate
in their case. 45 The district court agreed with the United States and
dismissed the case for want of subject matter jurisdiction. Although a
majority of the circuits that had considered the issue had declined
the Irwin invitation in the tax refund context, 46 the Ninth Circuit nevwith the taxpayers and applied the doctrine of equiertheless agreed
47
table tolling.

The Supreme Court reversed and affirmed the district court's
dismissal for lack of subject matterjurisdiction.4 ' The Court asked itself "Irwin's negatively phrased question: Is there good reason to believe that Congress did not want the equitable-tolling doctrine to apply?"4 9

The unanimous Brockamp Court answered the question by

concluding that "[w] e can travel no further.., along Irwin's road, for
there are strong reasons for answering Irwin's question in the Government's favor." 50 The Court examined the statute of limitations
and held that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply.
The Brockamp Court's decision rested on three grounds. First, the
language of the statute - which contained exceptions to the limitations period that did not include "equitable tolling" - precluded the
application of equitable considerations." Second, the Court noted
the intractable administrative problems that would arise if, given the
volume of tax refund claims, courts were to equitably toll the statute
of limitations. 52 And third, the Brockamp Court noted that the statute
44
45
46
47
48

49

50
51
52

United States v. Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849, 850 (1997).
See id. at 851.
See id. at 850-51 (citing authority from five circuits).
See id. at 851.
See id. at 853.
Id. at 851
Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. at 851.
See id. at 852.
See id.
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of limitations had always been aimed at protecting the government
from investigating stale claims, and "that history lacks any instance ...of equitable tolling.""
B. United States v. Beggerly
In 1950, Clark Beggerly, Jr., on behalf of his family, purchased a
portion of Horn Island in the Gulf of Mexico." In 1971, Congress
authorized the creation of a national park that included the island.
The National Park Service (NPS) entered negotiations with the Beggerlys for the purchase of the island. NPS later withdrew from the
negotiations because it concluded that the Beggerlys did not own the
island. NPS concluded that the United States had tide to the island
as a result of the Louisiana Purchase. In 1979, the United States
brought a quiet title action against the Beggerlys; the case was eventually settled for $208,000."
In 1994, the Beggerlys filed suit against the United States, asserting that evidence discovered in 1991 proved their ownership of Horn
Island, and they sought to unpack the 1979 settlement agreement
with the United States. The district court found no basis to exercise
jurisdiction over the Beggerlys' suit, and therefore dismissed the action. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court could
have exercised jurisdiction over the Beggerlys' claim pursuant to,
among other statutes, the Quiet Title Act (QTA).56 The Fifth Circuit

recognized that a straightforward application of the QTA's twelve-

57
year statute of limitations would have barred the Beggerlys's suit.

Nonetheless, the court cited Irwin and concluded that, under the
facts of the case, the QTA's twelve-year limitations period should be
equitably tolled.5 8
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the QTA's statute of
limitations could not be equitably tolled, the Beggerlys failed to
comply with the limitations period, and, therefore, the district court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the suit.5 9 The Beggerly Court's
conclusion rested on three grounds. First, citing the well-established
proposition that equitable tolling is impermissible when the plain
Id. at 853.
See United States v. Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 1864 (1998).
55 See
id.
SeeBeggerlyv. United States, 114 F.3d 484, 487-89 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd,
118 S.
Ct. 1862 (1998).
57 See id.
at 489.
58 See id. & n.19.
50 See Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. at 1868.
53
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terms of a statute dictate otherwise, 60 the Court concluded that the
QTA's statute of limitations contained equitable tolling. "[T]he
QTA," wrote the Court, "by providing that the statute of limitations
will not begin to run until the plaintiff 'knew or should have known
of the claim of the United States,' has already effectively allowed for
equitable tolling.'6 Second, finding the twelve-year limitations period to be "unusually generous," the Court reasoned that further extension of the limitations period "would be unwarranted." 62 Third,
the Beggerly Court looked to the purposes behind the QTA - certainty in determining property rights - and concluded that equitaover [property]
ble tolling "would throw a cloud of uncertainty
61
Act.,
the
with
incompatible
"is
which
rights,"
IV.

A.

IRWIN IN CONTEXT

ReconcilingIrwin with Brockamp and Beggerly

At first glance, Irwin appears to be irreconcilable with Brockamp
and Beggerly: Irwin seems to counsel against a statute-by-statute adjudication of the equitable-tolling question,64 whereas Brockamp and
Beggerly seem to invite such a case-by-case analysis by looking to the
purposes behind waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes.65 Adding to
the confusion are the seemingly contradictory holdings of Irwin and
United States v. Dalm.6 6 In Dalm, the Court held that limitations periods are jurisdictional if they condition the United States's waiver of
immunity.67 Irwin, it has been said, stands for the opposite proposition: Because limitations periods in waiver statutes may be equitably
tolled, those periods cannot be jurisdictional. Upon closer examination, however, the decisions can be harmonized with one another.
In Irwin, the Court held that, in cases in which the United States
has waived its immunity and subjected itself to suit in the same manner as a private defendant, there is a rebuttable presumption that the
limitations period in the waiver-of-immunity statute may be equitably
60 See id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g) (1994), the QTA's statute of limitations
provision).
61 Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(g), the QTA's statute of limitations).
62 Id.
63 Id.
64 See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95 (1990) (adopting
a
"general rule to govern the applicability of equitable tolling in suits against the government").
65 See Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. at 1868; Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. at 851-53.
494 U.S. 596 (1990).
67 See id. at 609-10.
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tolled.1 ' It is important to remember how the Court reached this result. The Court in Irwin was faced with an argument that different
limitations periods contained various degrees of linguistic stringency,
such that some statutes were interpreted to preclude equitable tolling
(the more stringent ones), while others were interpreted to permit
tolling (the less stringent ones). 69 The Court reasoned that, although
the language of the statutes differed, the difference did not mandate
a different result with respect to equitable tolling. ° Parsing the nuances of the particular limitations periods had the "disadvantage of
continuing unpredictability without the corresponding advantage of
greaterfidelity to the intent of Congress," the Court held.7 This latter portion of the Court's reasoning is crucial. It requires lower courts faced
with the equitable-tolling question to determine whether Congress
intended the statute to be equitably tolled, and not answer the question on the basis of linguistic nuances in the statute of limitations.
Brockamp and Beggerly are in lock-step with this approach. Ascertaining Congress's intent with respect to equitable tolling is at the
heart of Irwin's rebuttable-presumption rule of statutory construction. Brockamp and Beggerly represent two instances in which the presumption favoring equitable tolling is rebutted. In both cases, the
Court examined the text and purposes of the waiver-of-immunity
statutes and concluded that Congress did not intend to subject the
limitations periods to equitable tolling. Thus, rather than subscribe
to seemingly contradictory methods of statutory construction, Irwin,
Brockamp, and Beggerly promote uniformity in the way in which courts
See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 95-96. On this point, the Irwin Court seemed to overrule
its prior holding in Soriano v. United States, 352 U.S. 270 (1957), in which the Court
stated that "Congress was entitled to assume that the limitation period it prescribed
meant just that period and no more." Soriano, 352 U.S. at 276 (emphasis added).
The Irwin rebuttable-presumption rule effectively states the opposite of what was said
in Soriano, namely, that Congress permits equitable tolling unless a contrary legislative intent is shown. But see Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (citing Irwin for
the proposition that waivers of sovereign immunity cannot be implied, but must be
clearly expressed in the text of the waiver statute). Irwin seems to represent an application of another well-known canon of statutory construction - that when Congress enacts a statute, it does not act in a vacuum, but rather incorporates the common-law rules in existence at the time of the enactment (i.e., equitable tolling is
appropriate in cases involving private defendants). See, e.g., Molzof v. United States,
502 U.S. 301, 307-08 (1992). With that said, however, the Soriano Court did review
legislative intent and pointed out that Congress had provided tolling under some
circumstances, but not in those circumstances presented by that case. See Soriano,
352 U.S. at 276-77 & n.7. In this regard, the Sorianoanalysis looks very much like the
reasoning in Brockamp and Beggerly.
0 See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 94-95.
70 See id. at 95.
71 Id. (emphasis added).
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answer the equitable-tolling question. Brockamp and Beggerly reaffirm
the limited scope of Irwin by reminding lower courts that they must
ascertain whether Congress intended equitable tolling to apply to the
limitations period in the waiver-of-immunity statute at issue.
Moreover, Brockamp and Beggerly are also the latest reminders
from the Supreme Court that limitations periods in waiver-ofimmunity statutes can be jurisdictional prerequisites to suit, thereby
dispelling a myth that evolved from the misapplication of Irwin. That
is, even though Irwin said nothing about whether statutes of limitations are jurisdictional, some courts have nonetheless cited Irwin for
the proposition that, if equitable tolling is permissible, then limitations periods must not operate as jurisdictional prerequisites to suit
in federal court.7 This reading of Irwin is incorrect.
First, the Irwin Court affirmed the lower court's decision to dismiss the plaintiff's Title VII claim for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 3 Irwin, therefore, plainly contemplates that limitations periods
can be both jurisdictional and susceptible to equitable tolling.
Congress prescribes the temporal conditions under which Article III
courts may exercise jurisdiction over the United States. Limitations
periods that condition the United States's consent to suit are necessarily jurisdictional. But the point of Irwin is that the prescribed time
period need not be strictly applied and may be equitably tolled if
lengthening the time period is consistent with the congressional intent behind the statute. As long as there is no contrary legislative intent, equitable tolling does not expand Congress's waiver of immunity beyond legislatively acceptable limits. 75 That is why the Irwin
Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal for want of subject matter
jurisdiction, even though the thirty-day limitations period of Title VII
could be equitably tolled. The lower court lacked jurisdiction over
Seecases cited supra note 13.
See Irwin, 498 U.S. at 96.
74 See, e.g., Dillard v. Runyon, 928 F. Supp. 1316, 1324 (S.D.N.Y.
1997), affd, 108
F.3d 1369 (2d Cir. 1997) (unpublished table decision).
7s

75

See 2 LESTER S. JAYSON, HANDLING FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS § 14.05[1], at
14-71

n.13 (1997 rev. ed.) ("As Iruin makes clear, the inquiry as to whether equitable tolling is permissible turns on what Congress intended when enacting the statute of
limitations, not on whether a court has some inherent power to toll the limitations
period because it is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suing the government."); see
also American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559 (1974) (reviewing nonwaiver-of-immunity cases and holding "that the mere fact that a federal statute providing for substantive liability also sets a time limitation upon the institution of suit
does not restrict the power of the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.").
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Irwin's claim because he did not make his case for equitable tolling;
Irwin therefore did not satisfy a congressional condition of the waiver
of sovereign immunity.
76
Second, the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Dalr

belies any suggestion that Irwin constituted an across-the-board emasculation of the jurisdictional nature of limitations periods. In Dalm,
decided just eight months before Irwin, the Court explicitly pointed
out that limitations periods are jurisdictional in waiver-of-immunity
statutes when those time periods are conditions on Congress's waiver
of immunity - if the limitations period is a condition, it is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court." The Dalm Court affirmed a district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff failed to comply with the statute of
limitations.7798 Irwin did not cite, discuss, or modify Dalm - much less
overrule it.

Brockamp and Beggerly reaffirm the principles at work in Dalm. In
Brockamp, both the district court and the Ninth Circuit cited Dalm for
the proposition that the tax refund statute's limitations period was a
jurisdictional prerequisite to suit.8 0 Although the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's determination that equitable tolling was
appropriate, the Court did not disturb the lower courts' conclusion
that Dalm requires dismissal for want of subject matter jurisdiction
when a plaintiff does not comply with a limitations period that conditions the United States's waiver of immunity. Likewise, in Beggerly,
the district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 8' The Fifth Circuit reversed on the ground that the QTA
76

494 U.S. 596 (1990).

See id. at 609; see also United States v. Williams, 514 U.S. 527, 534 n.7 (1995)
(citing Dalm for the proposition that the statute of limitations in the tax refund statute "narrow[s] the waiver of sovereign immunity... by barring the tardy").
78 See Dalm, 494 U.S.
at 609-10.
Indeed, ChiefJustice Rehnquist authored Irwin, and he was joined by Justices
O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Blackmun. Justice Kennedy authored Dalm and
was joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Blackmun.
As some courts have recognized, it would be odd if, within the span of eight months,
these members of the Court would have subscribed to contradictory views about the
jurisdictional (or non-jurisdictional) nature of limitations periods in waiver-ofimmunity statutes. See Brockamp v. United States, 67 F.3d 260, 264-65 n.4 (9th Cir.
1995) (Fernandez,J., dissenting), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 849 (1997); Willis v. United States,
879 F. Supp. 889, 891 (C.D. Ill. 1994), affd, 65 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 1995)
(unpublished table opinion).
8 See Brockamp, 67 F.3d at 261; Brockamp v. United States, 859 F.
Supp. 1283,
1286 (C.D. Cal. 1994), rev'd, 67 F.3d 260 (9th Cir. 1995), rev'd, 117 S. Ct. 849 (1997).
81 See Beggerly v. United States, 114 F.3d 484, 486 (5th Cir. 1997), rev'd 118 S. Ct.
1862 (1998).
77
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provided the court with jurisdiction over the Beggerlys's claim.8 2 The
Supreme Court's conclusion that the QTA did not provide the Beggerlys ajurisdictional ticket to federal court - because the Beggerlys
did not comply with the QTA's statute of limitations - confirms
that
83
statutes of limitations may operate as jurisdictional bars to suit.

The short of the matter is that Brockamp and Beggerly shatter the
post-Irwin illusion that limitations periods in waiver-of-immunity statutes are not jurisdictional; they are, as long as the time periods are
conditions on the waiver of immunity. The decisions also provide a
clearer picture of when the presumption favoring equitable tolling is
rebutted in cases involving the United States as defendant. However,
because Brockamp is of recent vintage and because Beggerly was decided in the waning days of the 1997-1998 Supreme Court Term, the
impact of these decisions is not yet clear. Accordingly, in the next
section, we extract rules from Brockamp and Beggerly that should guide
lower courts as they wade through the confusion created by the repeated misapplication of Irwin.
B. EquitableTolling after Brockamp and Beggerly
In this Article, we surely are not suggesting that the Court in
Brockamp and Beggerly announced new rules of statutory construction
or created some new theoretical construct pursuant to which equitable-tolling questions may be evaluated. To the contrary, the Court
performed the bread-and-butter task of ascertaining congressional
intent through familiar canons of statutory interpretation, reflecting
the Court's increasingly pragmatic approach to statutory construction. 84 In Brockamp, for example, the Court reached the conclusion
that equitable tolling was improper only after examining the text,
legislative history, and purpose of the tax refund statute. In Beggerly,
the Court analyzed the QTA in the same way.
In light of this methodology, courts should have little difficulty
applying the Court's latest equitable-tolling decisions. In fact, the
principles at work in Brockamp and Beggerly can be reduced to a few
well-known rules of statutory construction. Specifically, the decisions
82

See id. at 489.

83 See United States v. Beggerly, 118 S.Ct. 1862, 1868 (1998).
84 For a good example of the Court's divergent views on the
subject, see United

States v. Thompson/CenterArms Co., 504 U.S. 505 (1992) (plurality opinion). Compare
Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192 (1996) (holding that a waiver of sovereign immunity
should be unequivocally expressed in the text of the statute) with id. at 212 (Stevens,
J.,joined by Breyer, J., dissenting) ("Our task... is not to educate busy legislators in
the niceties and details of scholarly draftsmanship, but rather to do our best to determine what message they intended to convey.").
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teach that courts should perform the following three-part analysis
when determining whether the limitations period in a waiver-ofimmunity statute should be equitably tolled:
(1) Does the waiver-of-immunity statute contain a tolling provision? If so, then courts may conclude that Congress did
not intend for judicially created equitable considerations
to creep into the tolling analysis. 85
(2) Is equitable tolling inconsistent with the text or purposes
of the statute in general or the limitations periods in particular (i.e., protecting the United States against adjudicating stale claims)? If so, then equitable tolling is improper.86
(3) Does the legislative history of the waiver statute or its limitations provisions evince a congressional intent to permit

85

See Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. at 1868 (holding that the "should have known" prong of

QTA's statute of limitations incorporated equitable tolling); United States v.
Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849, 851-52 (1997) (holding that provisions of the tax refund
statute of limitations permitted tolling under certain circumstances, but did not state
that "equitable tolling" was appropriate).
86 See Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. at 1868
(holding that equitable tolling of the QTA was
improper because tolling undermined the purpose of the statute - to promote security in property rights); Brockamp, 117 S.Ct. at 852 (holding that equitable tolling
was improper where statute of limitations evinced intent to protect the United States
against defending stale claims). Accord Johnson v. Office of Personnel Management,
155 F.3d 569 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision); RHI Holdings, Inc. v.
United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1461-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
We note one aspect of the Beggerly Court's reasoning that stands out in the
Court's equitable-tolling jurisprudence. Although the rationale behind the Beggerly
decision is for the most part consistent with Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
"generosity" portion of the Beggerly Court's reasoning is somewhat of an anomaly.
Was the Court suggesting that courts should make a determination of how generous
a statute of limitations is when determining whether or not to toll a statute of limitations? Could a court equitably toll a limitations period if, despite Congress's decision to prescribe a particular limitations period, a court decides that that period is
not generous enough? The answer to both questions must be no. When read in
context, the Beggerly Court's reference to the unusually lengthy limitations period in
the QTA can only be interpreted as a mere afterthought to the Court's central point
that equitable tolling of the QTA's statute of limitations was inconsistent with Congress's intent. Any other conclusion would allow courts to second-guess Congress's
judgment about the appropriate limitations period that should attach to congressionally created rights, and thereby permit courts to extend Congress's waiver of
immunity by way of a judicial determination that the particular limitations period is
not "generous" enough. Neither contention can be squared with well-established
canons of statutory construction in the waiver-of-sovereign-immunity context. See
United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1990); United States v. Kubrick, 444
U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382, 388-89 (1939).
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equitable tolling? If not, then equitable tolling is impermissible.8 '
These three considerations are mutually exclusive, so that any
one standing alone can support a finding that equitable tolling is inappropriate. With these principles in mind, we next shine the
Brockamp-Beggerly light on the questions of whether the FTCA's twoyear and six-month limitations periods are jurisdictional and whether
they should be equitably tolled.
V. THE IMPACT OF BROCKAMPAND BEGGERLYON THE FTCA

The Ninth Circuit in Brockamp and the Fifth Circuit in Beggerly
were surely not alone in reading Irwin as they did. As we have
pointed out, courts interpreting the FTCA in light of Irwin have done
precisely what the Brockamp and Beggerly panels did with the tax code
and the QTA - reflexively rely on Irwin for the proposition that equitable tolling is proper against the United States. Indeed, whether
the FTCA's limitations periods may be equitably tolled has produced
a kind of jurisprudential see-saw. Prior to Irwin, courts were unanimous in the view that the FTCA could not be equitably tolled; after
Irwin, courts tilted the other way, unanimously concluding that equitable tolling was permissible.88 And now, with Brockamp and Beggerly
on the books, what happens next remains unclear. What is clear,
however, is that courts should re-examine their FTCAjurisprudence
in light of Brockamp and Beggerly. As we show, the decisions compel
the conclusion that the FTCA's limitations periods are jurisdictional
and should not be equitably tolled.
A.

The FTCA 's Limitations Periods areJurisdictional

As we have suggested, some courts have read Irwin to mean that,
because equitable tolling may be appropriate in cases involving the
United States as defendant, the FTCA's limitations periods cannot be
a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal district court.8 9 The
main culprit in that line of cases is Schmidt v. United States (Schmidt
II).90 In Schmidt I, the court affirmed a district court's decision to
87 See Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. at 853 (holding that the history
of tax refund statute of
limitations showed that equitable tolling was not considered by Congress in the various revisions to the tax refund statute of limitations).
88
See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text; see also Abney, supra note
19, at
720 (arguing, pre-Irwin, that "[iut has become commonplace among federal courts
that the FTCA statute of limitations cannot be tolled by equitable principles.").
See supra note 13 and accompanying
text.
90 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir.
1991).
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dismiss an F'CA plaintiff's claim for failure to comply with the
FTCA's six-month limitations period." The Eighth Circuit concluded
that compliance with the six-month limitations period was a jurisdictional condition to plaintiffs suit, that the plaintiff therefore bore
the burden of proving that his claim was timely, and that the plaintiff
failed to meet that burden.92 After Schmidt I was decided, the Supreme Court handed down Irwin. The plaintiff sought certiorari review, and the Supreme Court vacated Schmidt I and remanded the
case to the Eighth Circuit for reconsideration in light of Irwin.
What happened next is puzzling. On remand, the Eighth Circuit did not analyze the FTCA to determine whether the six-month
time period could be equitably tolled. Rather, in Schmidt II, the court
concluded that Irwin stood for the proposition that the FTCA's statute of limitations was not jurisdictional and therefore could be equitably tolled. 3 Other courts have seized on Schmidt H and have concluded that the FTCA's statute of limitations is an affirmative defense4
and not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal district court. 1
Schmidt II is inconsistent with Irwin and the Brockamp-Beggerly framework.
As we have suggested, Iwin established that limitations periods
in waiver-of-immunity statutes can be both jurisdictional and subject
to equitable tolling.' 5 It is therefore incorrect to extract from Irwin,
Schmidt v. United States, 901 F.2d 680, 683 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. granted and
judgment vacated, 498 U.S. 1077 (1991), on remand, 933 F.2d 639 (8th Cir. 1991).
91

2 See id.

See Schmidt II, 933 F.2d at 640. The Schmidt II court also held that the United
States now bore the burden of proving that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the
six-month statute of limitations. See id. Whether the Schmidt 11 Court's allocation of
the burden of proof is correct is beyond the scope of this Article. For an analysis of
the proper burden-of-proof allocation in the FTCA context, see Ugo Colella & Adam
Bain, The Burden of ProvingJurisdiction Under the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Uniform Approach to Allocation, 67 FORDHAM L. REv. (forthcoming June 1999) (arguing that
Schmidt Ilwas wrongly decided).
93

94 See Kanar v. United States, 118 F.3d 527, 530-31 (7th Cir. 1997); Glarner
v.

United States Dep't of Veterans Admin., 30 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994); Ezenwa v.
Gallen, 906 F. Supp. 978, 984 (M.D. Pa. 1995); Diltz v. United States, 771 F. Supp.
95, 97 (D. Del. 1991). But see Willis v. United States, 879 F. Supp. 889, 891-92 (C.D.
Ill.
1994) (holding that Schmidt 11 and its progeny have read Irwin too broadly), afffd,
65 F.3d 171 (7th Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision). Schmidt II has surely not
carried the day in all courts, some having concluded that compliance with the
FTCA's statute of limitations is a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal district
court. See Flory v. United States, 138 F.3d 157, 159 (5th Cir. 1998); Coska v. United
States, 114 F.3d 319, 322 (1st Cir. 1997); Deutsch v. United States, 67 F.3d 1080,
1091 (3d Cir. 1995); Attallah v. United States, 955 F.2d 776, 779 (1st Cir. 1992);
Bradley v. United States, 951 F.2d 268, 270 (10th Cir. 1991).
95 See Part IV,
supra.
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as the Schmidt II court candidly did, an "implicit, 96 holding to the con-

trary. In Beggerly and Brockamp, the Supreme Court made it clear that,
when answering the equitable-tolling question, courts should determine whether equitable tolling is consistent with the statute under
review, and not read Irwin for the blanket proposition that equitable
tolling is always proper in cases involving the United States as defendant.9 Beggerly and Brockamp surely did not depart from what was
clear in Irwin itself: Equitable tolling is appropriate unless the particular statute or its legislative history evinces a contrary congressional intent.18 Accordingly, the Schmidt II court erred by failing to
perform a statutory analysis of the kind contemplated in Beggerly and
Brockamp.
Moreover, Dalm demonstrates quite clearly that the Schmidt II
court simply went too far in its interpretation of Irwin. As we have
pointed out, the Court in Dalm affirmed the longstanding rule that a
limitations period is ajurisdictional prerequisite to suit if that period
is a condition of the United States's consent to suit.9 The Court decided Dalm eight months before Irwin, and the Irwin Court did not
even refer to that decision. In addition, the Court in Kubrick held
that the FTCA's limitations periods are conditions on the United
States's consent to tort liability.'00 The Irwin Court, however, neither
cited nor overruled Kubrick. Therefore, contrary to the reasoning of
Schmidt II, Dalm and Kubrick compel the conclusion that the FTCA's
limitations periods are in fact jurisdictional prerequisites to suit in
federal district court.'0 ' Schmidt II and its progeny are plainly out of
step with Supreme Court precedent. They should not be followed.
See Schmidt II, 933 F.2d at 640.
See United States v. Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 1868 (1998) (declining to extend Irwin to the QTA because equitable tolling was built into the statute and because tolling was inconsistent with the purpose of the QTA); United States v.
Brockamp, 117 S. Ct. 849, 851-53 (1997) (declining to extend Irwin to tax statute because equitable tolling was inconsistent with the text of and purposes behind the tax
96
97

statute).
98 See Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498
U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990).
WJ See United States v. Dalm, 494 U.S. 596, 609-10 (1990).
100 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117-18 (1979).
101In Henderson v. United States, 517 U.S. 654 (1996), the Court held that a provision of the Suits in Admiralty Act was not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit. See
Henderson, 517'U.S. at 666-67. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist and

Justices Thomas and O'Connor expressly stated that Irwin did not stand for the
proposition that statutes of limitations in waiver-of-sovereign-immunity statutes are
not jurisdictional. See id. at 678 n.3 (Thomas, J., joined by Rehnquist, CJ. &
O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justices Scalia and Kennedy concurred in the majority's

result, but added the following:
I write separately to make clear that it is not my view, and I do not un-
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The FTCA 's Two-Year Limitations PeriodShould Not Be Equitably
Tolled

A straightforward application of the three-part, Brockamp-Beggerly
framework reveals that the FTCA's two-year limitations period should
not be equitably tolled. First, the FTCA already contains a tolling
provision. The Beggerly Court held that the QTA contained a de facto
equitable-tolling provision because the QTA's statute of limitations
does not begin to run unless the plaintiff knows or should know of a
cause of action against the United States. 0 2 The "should know"
prong of the QTA rule plainly contains a due diligence requirement.
Because equitable tolling is applied when the plaintiff acts with reasonable diligence, but cannot file her suit within the limitations period, the "should know" standard plainly contemplates some form of
tolling. 03 Like the QTA's statute of limitations, equitable tolling is
ostensibly part of the FTCA's two-year limitations period. It is hornbook FTCA law that the two-year period begins to run (i.e., a cause of
action accrues) when the plaintiff knew or should have known of his
injury and the cause of that injury. 14 The "should have known" portion of the rule accomplishes the same equitable purposes as tolling
- without, we might add, modifying the two-year period specified by
derstand the Court to hold, that no procedural provision can bejurisdictional. It is assuredly within the power of Congress to condition its
waiver of sovereign immunity upon strict compliance with procedural
provisions attached to the waiver, with the result that failure to comply
will deprive a court ofjurisdiction.
Id. at 672-73 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy, J., concurring). The views expressed in
Henderson confirm that at least five members of the presently constituted Court continue to adhere to Dalm's holding that statutes of limitations that are conditions of a
waiver of sovereign immunity are jurisdictional prerequisites to suit.
102 SeeUnited States v. Beggerly, 118 S. Ct. 1862, 1868
(1998).
103 See, e.g., Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir.
1996). Indeed,
a federal district court has recently held that Beggerly casts doubt on the proposition
that Irwin permits equitable tolling of the FTCA's two-year limitations period. See
White v. Paulsen, No. CS-97-239-RHW (E.D. Wash.Jan. 20, 1999).
104 See United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 121 (1979); Barnhart
v. United
States, 884 F.2d 295, 298-99 (7th Cir. 1989); Abney, supra note 19, at 721. But see
Sinclair & Szypszak, supra note 19, at 23 ("The diligence discovery rule [of Kubrick]
should not be characterized as an equitable tolling of the statute, notwithstanding
the obvious concern with fairness inherent in the diligence discovery rule.").
Whereas the QTA requires that the plaintiff know or, in the exercise of reasonable
diligence, should know, that he has a cause of action against the United States, the
FTCA has no such requirement. See id. at 121-22. If the plaintiff is confronted with
facts indicating that he has been injured and indicating the cause of that injury, the
two-year time period is triggered. See id. at 122-24. Under Kubrick, a plaintiff faced
with evidence of an injury and evidence of a cause, has an obligation to seek out advice to determine whether in fact he has a cause of action against the United States.
See id. at 123-24. Of course, this difference between the FTCA and the QTA does not
diminish the force of the conclusion that the Beggerly analysis applies to the FTCA.
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Congress. Thus, both the "should have known" prong of the QTA
and the judicially crafted definition of accrual in the FTCA accommodate the ends served by the doctrine of equitable tolling.
One may argue that Beggerly does not control in the FTCA context because, unlike the QTA, the FTCA's limitations-triggering rule
is a judicial construction and not expressed in the plain terms of the
FTCA. Thus, according to the critic, the FTCA does not present a
clear statutory statement that equitable tolling is impermissible. This
is a distinction without a difference. Indeed, the argument is unpersuasive precisely because it assumes that a judicial construction of a
waiver statute is somehow different in kind from an express congressional statement in the words of a statute. Courts are in the business
of ascertaining congressional intent; sometimes that intent is clearly
expressed in the terms of the statute, and sometimes it is not. In either event, courts locate and effectuate Congress's intent.
Second, equitable tolling is inconsistent with the purposes behind the FTCA's two-year limitations period. It is axiomatic that the
FTCA's two-year limitations period facilitates the prompt presentation and resolution of tort claims against the United States. 0 5 Equitable tolling extends the two-year time period in a manner that is inconsistent with this congressional goal. Even though courts are
ostensibly permitted to extend the two-year time period through application of the "should have known" prong of the limitations inquiry, equitable tolling would extend the time even further. This, of
course, increases the probability that administrative agencies will
have to investigate and the United States will have to defend stale
claims. 0 6 In addition, the FTCA gives agencies at least six months to
resolve tort claims, and although that period can be extended, Congress intended most claims to be resolved within six months after the
claim is presented to the agency. 0 7 Due to the large volume of tort
105

See, e.g., Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 117; Gould v. United States Dep't of Health &

Human Servs., 905 F.2d 738, 742 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc); H.R. REP. No. 1532, supra note 21, at 6-7; S. REP. No. 1327, supra note 21, at 2-3.
,or To be sure, the administrative-exhaustion scheme of the FTCA allows agencies
to collect evidence early enough to avoid the proof problems associated with the
passage of time. That ability to collect evidence on the front end, however, is surely
no justification for arguing that limitations periods may be extended through equitable tolling. The more time that passes, the more likely it is that evidence spoils,
witnesses' memories fade, and witnesses die.
107 See Improvement of Procedures in Claims Settlement and Government Litigation:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 13
(1966) (testimony of John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General) [hereinafter
1966 House Hearings]; see also Mack v. United States Postal Serv., 414 F. Supp. 504,
507-08 (E.D. Mich. 1976).
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claims submitted to federal agencies,' ° agency investigations into the
various bases for equitable tolling serve only to extend those investigations beyond the congressionally preferred six-month period.
Third, Congress's goals of facilitating the prompt presentation
and resolution of tort claims filed against the United States has stood
the test of time. Indeed, the history behind the FTCA's statute of
limitations demonstrates that, when revising the statute over the
years, Congress has cured the perceived unfairness inherent in statutes of limitations by means other than equitable tolling. The legislative history leading up to the enactment of the FTCA in 1946 is probative of Congress's intent with respect to equitable tolling.' °9 The
original version of the FTCA contained a one-year statute of limitations that did not on its face allow for equitable tolling." Before the
enactment of the FTCA, however, a number of bills were introduced
in Congress that provided for some form of equitable tolling."'
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26-30 (1953) (examining legislative history leading up to enactment of the FTCA for an understanding of what
Congress intended with respect to the discretionary function exception); United
States v. Yellow Cab Co., 340 U.S. 543, 549-50 & n.8 (1951) (imposing heavy weight
on Congress's decision to omit, from the Act finally passed, language from previous
bills and legislative reports introduced in the years leading up to the enactment of
the FTCA).
110 See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified in
scattered sections of 2, 33 & 40 U.S.C.).
I Between 1926 and 1930, Congress introduced a number of tort-claim bills that
extended the prescribed limitations period for "reasonable cause shown" and permitted tolling for minority, mental incapacity, and persons at sea. See S. 4377, 71st
Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202(a), 304 (1930); H.R. 15428, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. §§ 202(a),
304 (1930); H:R. 9285, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202(a), 304 (1928); H.R. REP. No.
286, 70th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1928); H.R. 9285, 70th Cong., 2d Sess. §§ 202(a), 304
(1929); S. 1912, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202(a), 304 (1926); H.R. REP. No. 667, 69th
Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1926); 67 CONG. REc. 11,110 (June 10, 1926) (statement of Rep.
Johnson); H.R. 6716, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 202(c), 305 (1926). In 1931, the
House considered bills that omitted the "reasonable cause" provision, but retained
tolling for minority, mental incapacity, and persons at sea. See H.R. 16429, 71st
Cong., 3d Sess. § 34 (1931); H.R. 17168, 71st Cong., 1st Sess. § 304 (1931). The
Senate bill and another House bill considered that year, however, did not contain
any tolling provisions. See S. 211, 72 Cong., 1st Sess. (1931), H.Rt 5065, 72d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1931). In 1933, the House did not include the "reasonable cause" tolling
provision and, instead, provided for tolling based on physical disability, minority,
and mental incapacity. See H.RI 129, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(h), 11 (1933). The
Senate, however, retained a modified version of the "reasonable cause" provision
(i.e., allowing 90 extra days if reasonable cause is shown) and only permitted tolling
on the basis of physical disability. SeeS. 1833, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1(c), 203(b)(1)
108
1

(1933); see also S. 4567, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1(c), 202(a) (1932). In 1935, the
House and Senate introduced bills virtually identical to the 1933 bills. See H.R. 2028,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 2(h), 11 (1935); S. 1043, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 1(c),
203(b)(1) (1935).
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Those tolling provisions, however, never made it into the Act eventually passed in 1946.
In 1949, Congress changed the FTCA's "manifestly unjust" statute of limitations, extending the one-year period to two years.' 2 Notably, Congress made these changes without turning to the doctrine
of equitable tolling. For example, like the bills introduced prior to
the enactment of the FTCA, H.R. 2403 permitted tolling on the basis
of infancy and insanity, yet that bill died in the House." 3 Rather than
carve out certain exceptions to the statute of limitations and thereby
incorporate some form of equitable tolling into the FTCA, Congress
chose instead to increase the limitations period from one to two years
for all tort claimants. Specifically, Congress reviewed state and federal statutes of limitations applicable to tort suits and concluded that
the one-year limitations period was out of step with the state and fed-

Between 1939 and the enactment of the FTCA in 1946, Congress considered a
number of torts-claim bills, but this time no tolling of the prescribed limitations periods was ever provided. See H.R. 181, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1945); S. 1114,
78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1943); H.R. 1356, 78th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401 (1943); S.
2221, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1942); S. 2207, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1942);
H.R. 6463, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. § 401 (1942); H.R. 5373, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. § 401
(1941); H.R. 5185, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. (1941); H.R. 5299, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 301 (1941); S.2690, 76th Cong., 1st Sess. § 301 (1939); H.R. 7236, 76th Cong., 1st
Sess. § 301 (1939). The pre-enactment limitations periods of "one year for claims
over $1,000 and six months for claims under $1,000 that were submitted to an
agency" were not only eventually prescribed in the original version of the FTCA, but
were also applauded for being "short" and protecting the interests of the United
States. See HOUSE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, TORT CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES,
H.R. REP. No. 2428, at 5 (1940) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 2428]; Tort Claims
Against the United States: Hearings Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciay,
76th Cong., 3d Sess. 11 (1940) (statement of Frank Murphy, Attorney General of the
United States); id. at 35, 38 (statement of Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to
the Attorney General) [hereinafter 1940 Senate Hearing]; Tort Claims Against the
United States: Hearings Before Subcomm. No. 1 of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 76th
Cong., 3d Sess. 21 (1940) (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff) [hereinafter 1940 House
Hearing]. If a plaintiff could not comply with the limitations periods, Congress contemplated relief, not through equitable tolling of those periods, but through a private bill. See 1940 Senate Hearing, supra at 38 (statement of Alexander Holtzoff); id.
at 47 (testimony of Alexander Holtzofl); 1940 House Hearing, supra at 21 (testimony
of Alexander Holtzoff).
112 See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, AMENDING
THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
TO INCREASE THE TIME WITHIN WHICH CLAIMS UNDER SUCH ACT MAY BE PRESENTED TO
FEDERAL AGENCIES OR PROSECUTED IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS, H.R. Rep.
No. 276, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1949) [hereinafter H.R. Rep. No. 276]; SENATE
COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY, AMENDING TITLE 28 OF THE UNITED STATES CODE TO PROVIDE
ADDITIONAL TIME FOR BRINGING SUIT AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN THE CASE OF
CERTAIN TORT CLAIMS, S. Rep. No. 135, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1949) [hereinafter S.
Rep. No. 135].

H.R. 2403, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. (1949).
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eral legislative landscape."14 The legislative history confirms this interpretation of congressional intent:
It is not the intention of the Federal Government to deprive tort

claimants [of] their day in court or of their remedies. Nor, on the
other hand, does it propose to encourage delay in the enforcement of a claimant's rights or to harass the Federal agencies in
their defense against such suits by increasing the difficulty of their
procurement of evidence. However, it is not believed that the enlargement of the existing period of limitations to 2 years... will
unnecessarily vex the agencies concerned, nor will it foster a lack
of diligence on the part of claimants in the prosecution of their
claims. The period of 2 years... represents a happy medium
which has been tested and found satisfactory in the laboratory of
legal experience."'
The 1949 legislative history plainly suggests that the two-year
limitations period in § 2401 (b) reflects a congressional balance - a
"happy medium," in Congress's words - between compensating tort
victims and protecting the United States against defending stale

claims. A bill that would have provided for some form of equitable
tolling never made it out of the House. It should follow, therefore,
that the 1949 Congress did not intend the two-year period to be equitably tolled.
Furthermore, in 1966, Congress once again changed the statute
of limitations to conform with the new, mandatory administrativesettlement process; the two-year period now applied to filing administrative claims with the appropriate federal agency, and claimants had
six months after their claim was finally denied to file suit in federal
district court.1 6 Consistent with the view of prior Congresses, the
1966 Congress did not make equitable tolling applicable to tort suits
against the United States. That same year, however, Congress enacted a three-year limitations period for tort claims filed by the
United States, and that limitations period did include a tolling provision."1 7 These changes were considered together."' Congress's clear
intent to permit tolling under limited circumstances in cases involving the United States as plaintiff combined with Congress's unwill-

114

See H.R. REP. No. 276, supra note 112, at 2-4; S. REP. No. 135, supra note 112,

at 2-4.

H.R. REP. No. 276, supra note 112, at4; S. REP. No. 135, supra note 112, at 2-3.
116 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2401(b), 2675(a) (1994).
117 28 U.S.C. §§ 2415 (statute of limitations), 2416 (tolling provisions) (1994).
118 See HOUSE COMM. ON THEJUDIcIARY, ESTABLISHING A STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS FOR
115

CERTAIN ACTIONS BROUGHT BY THE GOVERNMENT,

Sess. 3 (1966).

H.R. Rep. No. 1534, 89th Cong., 2d
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ingness to permit such tolling when the United States is sued in tort,
compels the conclusion that Congress did not intend equitable tolling to apply to the two-year limitations period in § 2401 (b).
Our suggestion that Congress did not intend the two-year limitations period to be equitably tolled does not conflict with our contention that tolling is ostensibly built into the two-year period. The
"should have known" prong of FTCA accrual (like the "should have
known" aspect of QTA accrual) defines when the limitations clock
begins to run. Plainly, Beggerly and the FTCA contemplate that equitable considerations may postpone the date on which a limitations
period begins to run. Once a claim has accrued, though, a plaintiff
has two years to file an administrative claim with the appropriate federal agency; the "should have known" standard does not at all extend
the two-year period. Equitable tolling, on the other hand, does extend the two-year period for judge-made equitable reasons, so that an
FTCA plaintiff would have more than two years to file an administrative claim. Beggerly, we have argued, precludes such a result because
applying the doctrine of equitable tolling to the onset of a limitations
period serves essentially the same purpose as equitably tolling the period itself.
In sum, the history of the FTCA's two-year limitations period reveals quite clearly that, although Congress materially changed the
statute three times, Congress never incorporated equitable tolling
into the FTCA, even when Congress was seeking to avoid "manifestly
unjust" outcomes and simultaneously permitting such tolling in cases
involving the United States as plaintiff. In addition, both prior to
and after the enactment of the FTCA, Congress rejected legislation
that would have provided some form of equitable tolling for tort
claims brought against the United States." 9 Yet, from the time ConI19

In 1989, two bills were introduced in the House that would have tolled the

FTCA's two-year limitations period on the basis of minority and "legal disability."

H.R. 3260 provided that the two-year period would not begin running until the
FTCA claimant reached the age of eighteen, and H.R. 3261 would have started the
two-year clock running as soon as a "legal disability" ceased. See H.R. 3260, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. H5674-09 (minority); H.R. 3261, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., 135 CONG. REC. H5674-09 (mental incapacity). Neither bill, however, has been
enacted by Congress. Although the Supreme Court has said that "failed legislative
proposals are 'a particularly dangerous ground on which to rest an interpretation of
a prior statute,"' Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver,
N.A., 511 U.S. 164, 186 (1994) (quoting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV
Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 650 (1990)), that admonition should not carry much weight in
the FTCA context. The Court has limited its concern about failed legislative proposals to those instances in which bills are introduced but not enacted after the statute under review was passed. An argument could therefore be made that the 1989
bills should not be included in any analysis of whether equitable tolling is consistent
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gress enacted the FTCA until today, Congress's intent to protect the
United States against stale tort claims has remained firm.120 This history, together with the built-in tolling provision embodied in the
"should know" prong of the two-year limitation period, suggests that
the two-year time limitation should not be equitably tolled.
C.

The FTCA 's Six-Month LimitationsPeriodShould Not Be
Equitably Tolled

As with the two-year limitations period, application of the threepart Brockamp-Beggerly analysis compels the conclusion that the
FTCA's six-month limitations period should not be equitably tolled. 2'
with the FTCA. Nonetheless, bills that were introduced and rejected before the enactment of the FTCA and bills that were introduced and rejected when the FTCA's
statute of limitations was changed, are certainly probative of congressional intent at
the time the FICA was enacted and at the time the statute of limitations was
changed. See, e.g., Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 26-30 (1953) (examining
legislative history leading up to enactment of the FTCA for an understanding of
what Congress intended with respect to the discretionary function exception).
120 See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1532, supra note 21, at 6-7; S. REP. No. 1327, supra note
21, at 2-3; H.R. REP. No. 276, supra note 112, at4; S. REP. No. 135, supra note 112, at
2-3; H.R. REP. No. 2428, supra note 111, at 5.
Although we only discuss the six-month limitations period applicable to formal
agency denials, we note that a tort claim may be finally denied for exhaustion purposes if, after six months passes and the agency has not issued a formal denial, a
claimant exercises the so-called deeming option. See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994).
Some courts have held that no limitations period applies to the deemed-denial option because § 2401(b) does not specify a limitations period for deemed denials. See
Pascale v. United States, 998 F.2d 186, 187-93 (3d Cir. 1993); Parker v. United States,
935 F.2d 176, 177-78 (9th Cir. 1991); Hannon v. United States Postal Serv., 701 F.
Supp. 386, 388-90 (E.D.N.Y. 1988). Plainly, if no statute of limitations applies to
deemed denials, then the question of equitable tolling never arises. A good argument can be made, however, that the six-month time period applicable to formal
denials should also apply to deemed denials. See generally Ugo Colella, The Case for
Borrowing a Limitations Periodfor Deemed-Denial Suits Brought Pursuantto the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 35 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 391 (1998) (arguing that § 2401(b)'s silence on the
limitations question requires courts to borrow the analogous six-month limitations
period applicable to formal denials).
In this Article, we shall not explore the complexities of the deemeddenial/statute of limitations problem. Suffice it to say that, assuming the six-month
limitations period applicable to formal denials also applies to deemed denials, equitable tolling of that six-month period would be inappropriate. The purpose of the
deeming option is just that, to give the FTCA plaintiff the option to trigger the sixmonth period "any time" after the mandatory settlement process expires. See 28
U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1994). By its very nature, equitable tolling, if applied against the
United States as defendant, addresses acts taken by the United States before the limitations period is triggered. In the run-of-the-mill equitable-tolling case, the defendant commits some act that postpones the running of the limitations clock. See, e.g.,
Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1996). Nothing the United
States does affects the limitations period as it applies to deemed denials because the
plaintiff controls when the six-month clock begins running. Equitable tolling is
therefore anathema to the deemed-denial option of the FTCA. See, e.g., Lampf,
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The six-month time period in the FTCA imposes upon plaintiffs a
time limitation for filing suit in federal district court after their administrative claims have been finally denied. 2 2 As the text of
§ 2401 (b) makes clear, the six-month clock begins to run "after the
date of mailing, by certified or registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which [the claim] was presented."' 23
Once the United States complies with the terms of § 2401 (b) by issuing a final denial by certified or registered mail, the FTCA plaintiff
suit in federal
has six months from the date of the denial letter to file
24
"forever.',
barred
is
claim
the
otherwise
district court,
Although the six-month period does not contain a built-in tolling provision of the Beggerly kind, a careful consideration of the purpose and history of the six-month period reveals that it should not be
equitably tolled. First, like the two-year limitations period, the sixmonth period is designed to ensure prompt presentation and resolution of claims against the United States. 2 5 Because the six-month period reflects a legislative choice about the proper time period within
which tort claims against the United States should be commenced,
judicial extension of the six-month period through the doctrine of
equitable tolling would frustrate the clearly expressed intent of Congress.
Second, the history of the six-month period confirms the view
that Congress did not intend judicially crafted equitable considerations to apply to the six-month limitations period. Prior to the enactment of the FTCA in 1946, Congress considered a series of bills
that provided for a bare-bones administrative settlement scheme for
claims that were less than $1,000. In each of those bills, Congress
provided for some form of equitable tolling of the limitations period
However, those tolling
applicable to the administrative process.
provisions never made it into the Act that was eventually passed in
1946.
The original version of the FTCA imposed a six-month limitations period for suits filed on the heels of an unsuccessful administrative settlement process. Like the administrative-settlement scheme
Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, 501 U.S. 350, 363 (1991) (holding
equitable tolling improper when doctrine is "fundamentally inconsistent" with the
operation of the limitations period).
122 See Part II, supra.
124

28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1994).
See id ,

15

See, e.g., Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 274-75 (10th Cir.

12

1991).
16

See supranote 111 (citing bills considered between 1926 and 1935).
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proposed in prior bills, the FTCA at first did not contain a mandatory
administrative-settlement scheme; claimants could withdraw their
claims (if the claims did not exceed $1,000, raised to $2,500 in 1959)
from agency consideration. 12 Plaintiffs who waited out the administrative process and those who withdrew their claims from agency consideration had six months to file suit in federal district court. 28 The
purpose of the six-month period was identical to that underlying the
two-year limitations period: prompt presentation of tort claims
against the United States.' "
In 1966, Congress "simplified" the language of § 2401 (b) to reflect the changes made to the FTCA (i.e., imposing upon FTCA
claimants a mandatory administrative-exhaustion scheme). 30 The sixmonth limitations period remained in the statute and was aimed at
ensuring the prompt presentation of tort suits against the United
States.' 3' Congress did not provide for any tolling of the six-month
period once a final denial was properly mailed to the FTCA claimant.
Like the two-year period, then, the six-month limitations period represents a congressional balance between compensating tort plaintiffs
and protecting courts and the United States from adjudicating and
defending stale claims. 32 Introducing equitable considerations into
the six-month limitations inquiry would, by definition, upset this
congressional balance.
Congress's intent not to permit equitable tolling of the sixmonth period comes through even clearer when one considers the
limitations period Congress chose for tort cases in which the United
States is the plaintiff. In 1966, Congress changed the FTCA and, at
the same time, enacted a statute of limitations for tort suits brought
by the United States; Congress prescribed a three-year limitations period, and the six-month time period in § 2401 (b) factored into that
determination. 3 3 Congress arrived at the three-year period by adding
together the time periods prescribed for FTCA plaintiffs: two years
127

See 28 U.S.C. § 2675(b), repealed and replaced by, 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a) (1988).

128

See Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 812 (codified in

scattered sections of 2, 33 & 40 U.S.C.).
29

See, e.g., 1940 Senate Hearing, supra note 111, at 11 (statement of Frank Mur-

phy, Attorney General of the United States) (stating that six-month period was
"short" and protected the interests of the United States); 1940 House Hearing, supra
note 111, at 21 (testimony of Alexander Holtzoff, Special Assistant to the Attorney
General) (same).
130 See, e.g., H.R. RErP. No. 1532, supra note 21, at 5.
131 See, e.g., Pipkin v. United States Postal Serv., 951 F.2d 272, 274-75 (10th Cir.

1991).
132

133

See id.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2415 (1994).
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for administrative presentment, six months for settlement discussions, and then six months to file suit after a final denial.3 4 Recognition of a firm six-month period in the legislative math suggests that
Congress did not intend the six-month time period to be equitably
tolled - especially because Congress that same year and in the same
set of bills provided for tolling of the three-year period applicable to
the United States.
In the end, the history and purpose of the six-month limitations
period are largely identical to the purpose and history of the two-year
period. Before the FTCA was enacted, Congress considered a number of bills that would have permitted equitable tolling of the time
period applicable to suits filed after the administrative-settlement
process ended. But those provisions never made it into the final version of the FTCA. In addition, in 1949 Congress considered a bill
that would have equitably tolled the FTCA's two-year and six-month
limitations periods; yet, that tolling provision was not included in the
FTCA either. In 1966, Congress provided for equitable tolling of the
limitations period applicable to the United States as plaintiff but did
not allow tolling for FTCA plaintiffs. This history combined with the
well-established purpose of ensuring prompt presentation of tort
claims against the United States leads inescapably to the conclusion
that Congress did not intend the six-month period to be equitably
tolled.'35
VI. CONCLUSION

Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Irwin, courts faced with
the question of whether the FTCA's limitations periods should be
equitably tolled answered that question by examining the purposes
behind the limitations periods and comparing those purposes to the
principles underlying equitable tolling. That methodology compelled the conclusion that the FTCA's limitations periods are jurisdictional and that equitable tolling is inconsistent with Congress's inSee 1966 House Hearings,supranote 107, at 8.
Some agencies have promulgated regulations that permit tolling of the sixmonth period if an FI'CA plaintiff moves for reconsideration of the agency's denial
of the tort claim. See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 14.9(b) (1998). We express no opinion on the
validity of these regulations, although at least one court has. See Bond v. United
States, 934 F. Supp. 351, 356 (C.D. Cal. 1996) (holding that FTCA regulations permitting for tolling of six-month period during reconsideration process cannot alter
the jurisdiction of the court). Suffice it to say that, even assuming these regulations
are valid because Congress delegated to agencies the authority to alter the plain
terms of § 2401(b), the regulations do not affect our conclusion that the six-month
period cannot be tolled for judge-made equitable considerations.
134

135
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tent. That all changed with Irwin, and not for the better. Now that
the Supreme Court has clarified Irwin's limited reach, courts should
revisit the questions of whether the FTCA's limitations periods are
jurisdictional and whether those periods should be equitably tolled.
The Court's recent decisions in Brockamp and Beggerly provide courts
with a relatively clear set of rules with which to answer these questions.
Judge Learned Hand had this to say about a jurisprudence
marked by seemingly confusing precedents: "'The law being in an
entirely unsettled condition, I think that we ought to fix the rule we
mean to follow, else the cases will continue to be at odds indefinitely."'136 In this Article, we have heeded Judge Hand's prescient advice by providing courts with a solution to the Irwin problem that is
faithful to the text and legislative history of the FTCA as well as the
Brockamp-Beggerly framework. Courts should conclude, we have argued, that the FTCA's two-year and six-month limitations periods are
jurisdictional, and that the text, purposes, and legislative history of
the FrCA reveal that those limitations periods should not be equitably tolled as a matter of law. In the end, application of the three-part
Brockamp-Beggerly analysis to the FTCA will add a welcome dose of uniformity and predictability to an area of federal law that has been unnecessarily punctuated by confusion and inconsistency.
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